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The advantages and disadvantages of public sector decentralization are widely discussed in economics and political 
science. Some authors argue that decentralization leads to an optimal provision of public services and promotes 
economic growth, while others emphasize the dangers of competition between sub-national governments, especially 
those associated with interregional redistribution. Using cross-section and panel data for 23 OECD countries from 1982 
to 2000, this paper empirically studies the impact of fiscal decentralization on regional disparities. We find that a higher 
degree of decentralization is associated with lower regional disparities. Hence, poor regions experience no 
disadvantages from decentralization and instead appear to benefit. 
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Since the 1970s, there has been an increasing interest in the vertical organization of governments in
developed and developing countries. The main question is whether it is advantageous to give sub-
national governments more authority and autonomy in decision making or to make decisions at the
central level of government. Many economists propose assigning more competencies to sub-national
governments to promote economic development [see Oates (1999)]. The primary argument is that
decentralization increases overall government eciency [Oates (1972)]. Decentralization brings the
government closer to the people; local ocials are better informed about local needs and thus are
more able to set the optimal mix of local policies than are central bureaucrats. This increase in
eciency contributes to economic growth. Based on these ideas, many countries all over the world
have started to allocate more and more competencies to sub-national jurisdictions. Belgium, for
example, became a federal state in 1993; Italy, Spain, and Portugal are moving in the same direc-
tion. Decentralization initiatives, however, are taking place not just in highly developed countries
but also in developing nations such as Mexico, Bolivia or Belarus. The general decentralization
trend in developing countries is supported by the World Bank, which considers decentralization to
be a main part of its poverty reduction programs [Development Committee (2006)]. An example
of a trend in the opposite direction is the European Union, which is centralizing an increasing
amount of responsibilities, reducing the autonomy of its member countries.
In addition to the potential gains of decentralization, several observers are concerned about the
redistributive eects of decentralization within federations [Prud'homme (1995) and Tanzi (1996)].
There are several arguments why decentralization might have regressive eects (see section 2 for
details). A centralized government, for example, would have more equalizing power due to its larger
scal capacity compared to a decentralized one. Moreover, if decentralization leads to more scal
competition, richer regions will be more attractive to mobile factors because these regions often
provide better qualied human capital, closer markets, and a better infrastructure at comparatively
low costs. Under these circumstances, if decentralization proceeds, richer regions will get richer and
poorer regions poorer [see Prud'homme (1995)]. There are, nevertheless, several arguments that
might explain a positive eect of decentralization on regional inequality. Qian and Weingast (1997)
discuss the incentive eects of decentralization in a setting of inter-jurisdictional competition. In
a decentralized system, economically less developed regions may oer more attractive investment
conditions, e.g., more 
exible labor markets, a less generous welfare state, or lower tax rates. The
investments they attract will help poor regions to catch up with richer ones without centrally
mandated redistribution.
2In light of these opposing theoretical arguments, the eect of decentralization on regional disparities
is ambiguous, and empirical work is necessary. Surprisingly, only a handful of studies have focused
on this issue. Single-country studies include Kim et al. (2003) for the case of Korea, Akai and Sakata
(2004) for the US, Kanbur and Zhang (2005) for China, and Bonet (2006) for Colombia. These case
studies present a mixed picture of the eect of scal decentralization on regional disparities. While
decentralization has fostered disparities in the abovementioned developing countries, a positive
impact of decentralization on regional inequality could be observed for the US. However, the results
of single-country studies are hardly assignable to other countries, and, therefore, the investigation of
cross-country data is a more appropriate strategy to shed light on this research question. Shankar
and Shah (2003), Gil Canaleta et al. (2004), Rodr guez-Pose and Gill (2004), and Ezcurra and
Pascual (2008) make use of cross-country data.
Studying a sample of developed and developing countries, Shankar and Shah (2003) conclude that
federal countries restrain regional inequalities more successfully than unitary countries. However,
the result of this rst cross-country study must be interpreted with caution since the estimations
are based on very few observations and might suer from an omitted variable bias as well as an
endogeneity bias. Moreover, the authors use a dummy variable as a measure for decentralization
and therefore consider only one of the dierent facets of decentralization. Most of this criticism also
applies to the subsequent cross-country studies. Gil Canaleta et al. (2004) nd a negative corre-
lation between decentralization and regional inequality in a study that distinguishes between nine
dierent measures of political and scal decentralization. The power of the underlying estimations
is low, since the results are based on 17 observations and do not consider any control variables.
The study by Rodr guez-Pose and Gill (2004) contrasts these ndings. Based on several case
studies of developed as well as developing countries, the authors conclude that the devolution of
powers has fostered inequity of regions in most of the countries considered, but they have to admit
that the direction of causality remains unconrmed. Moreover, they do not distinguish between
dierent decentralization measures. The recent study by Ezcurra and Pascual (2008) is able to
overcome some of the empirical weaknesses of the former ones by using panel data. Among others,
the advantages of using panel data include the greater number of observations and the ability to
control for unobserved heterogeneity between countries and in time. The main result is that scal
decentralization is negatively correlated with the level of regional inequality in European Union
member countries. This nding is robust for several data adjustments. However, this study does
not distinguish between dierent decentralization measures, and again the direction of causality
remains unclear.
Against this background, the aim of our paper is to investigate the relationship between scal
3decentralization and regional inequality using a new and wider data set. For this purpose, we
analyze cross-country as well as panel data for 23 OECD countries covering the period 1982-2000.
In addition to the application of this larger data set, which allows us to consider a wide range
of important control variables, the major contribution of this paper to the existing literature is
twofold: we make use of dierent alternative decentralization measures, and we apply several more
sophisticated estimation procedures to consider potential reverse causality.
The rst issue is related to the diculty of measuring decentralization. Because the interesting
variable is unobservable, we have to nd feasible approximations. A dummy variable that re
ects
whether a country has a unitary or federal constitution, for example, is not able to re
ect the
dierent aspects of the devolution of powers to sub-national governments satisfactorily. Standard
decentralization measures are based on nancial accounts and relate the sub-national government
expenditures (or revenues) to the total government expenditures (revenues). This class of de-
centralization measures, however, is not able to account for the factual autonomy of sub-national
jurisdictions, as it is often the case that decisions are made at the central level of government but are
executed at the sub-national level, which receives a corresponding nancial grant [Oates (1972)].
Therefore, we apply decentralization measures that only consider own revenues of sub-national
governments [Rodden (2004) and Stegarescu (2005)].
The second issue is the problem of potential reverse causality associated with the risk of an en-
dogeneity bias on the coecients of the independent variables. One might argue that in very
heterogeneous countries with high regional disparities, there is pressure for more centralization,
since people believe that the higher redistributive power of a centralized government will be able
to produce a more equal distribution of resources. In this case, the direction of causality runs from
regional inequality to centralization, and we have the problem of reverse causality. To overcome
this methodological problem that characterizes all existing empirical studies, we apply instrumental
variable techniques as well as dynamic panel estimation methods [Baltagi (1995)].
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide an overview of the
theoretical arguments concerning the relationship between decentralization and regional disparities.
Section 3 describes our data, focusing on alternative measurement concepts of decentralization
and regional inequality. In section 4 we conduct our econometric analysis, and we apply several
robustness tests in section 5. Finally, we sum up our ndings and conclude in section 6.
42 The theoretical link between decentralization and regional
disparities
The main argument in favor of decentralization is that the transfer of powers to sub-national gov-
ernments increases public sector eciency, and thus promotes economic development and growth
[Oates (1993)]. Decentralized authorities are much better informed about local needs and can
better provide the economically ecient quantity and quality of local public goods. Especially in
the case of a federation with heterogeneous regions, decentralized ocials are in a better position
to meet local demands [Oates (1972)]. The inter-regional mobility of the population can enhance
these eciency gains [Tiebout (1956)]. Another argument in favor of scal decentralization is the
role of local governments to preserve markets [Weingast (1995)]. The idea is that the government
acts as monopolist and has the power to exploit the private sector. In a decentralized setting, scal
competition limits the government's ability to extract rents, thereby enhancing economic eciency
and thus economic growth.1
Some of these arguments could also be made in the case of regional development, which is the focus
of our study. Decentralization can provide sub-national governments with the power to actively
pursue economic development policies. If sub-national governments are better informed about lo-
cal strengths and weaknesses, they will also be able to provide better local policies as compared to
the central government. Moreover, a certain degree of sub-national autonomy gives local ocials
the opportunity to attract businesses to their particular regions, e.g., by granting tax privileges
or oering other forms of assistance [Martinez-Vazquez and McNab (2003)]. There can also be a
positive eect of decentralization on private economic localization, as a close communication chan-
nel to the administration is advantageous for businesses. Qian and Weingast (1997) emphasize
the incentive eect of inter-jurisdictional competition after scal decentralization. Competition
among jurisdictions forces governments to represent citizen interests and to preserve markets since
inter-jurisdictional competition acts as a disciplinary device to punish sub-national government
ocials for inappropriate market intervention. Local governments could be removed if they fail to
achieve standards of wealth and growth comparable with those of the rest of the country. More-
over, Qian and Weingast (1997) argue that decentralization gives less developed regions a necessary
instrument to compete with richer ones by providing more attractive investment conditions, e.g.,
by means of more 
exible labor markets or a less generous welfare state. \Jurisdictional compe-
1There are several empirical studies that test this theory of a link between scal decentralization and economic
growth, single country studies, e.g., Zou (1998), Akai (2002), or Jin et al. (2005), as well as cross-country studies,
e.g., Davoodi and Zou (1998), Yilmaz (1999), Iimi (2005), or Thornton (2007). Altogether, the results of these
studies are inconclusive since some studies nd a positive relationship between decentralization and growth, some
studies nd no signicant results, and some nd a negative relationship.
5tition can therefore reduce regional inequality without centrally-mandated redistribution"[Qian &
Weingast (1997), p. 87]. Indeed, there is some anecdotal evidence supporting this view. After the
Civil War, the defeated American South had fallen far behind the North economically, but 
exible
labor market conditions, along with other local growth-enhancing policies, helped the poor South
to catch up with the rich North [McKinnon (1997)]. Another example is the case of Ireland, which
experienced rapid growth during the 1990s. Levying much lower taxes than core European regions
was a crucial factor in overcoming the disadvantages caused by its peripheral location. Harmo-
nization and centralization would have prevented this convergence process [Baldwin and Krugman
(2004)]. Thus, decentralization can strengthen regional growth and contribute to a more equal
factor distribution.
There are also some reasons to suppose that inter-jurisdictional competition has negative eects
on regional inequality. According to Prud'homme (1995), rich regions will have a larger tax base
than poorer jurisdictions and will therefore collect more taxes and provide more local public goods.
Richer regions could also provide the same quantity and quality of public goods than poorer regions
but at lower tax rates. In both cases, mobile businesses and households will prefer richer juris-
dictions, enlarging the tax base and increasing the gap in income between regions [Prud'homme
(1995), p. 203]. Another issue concerning the relationship between scal decentralization and re-
gional disparities is the redistribution aspect. Oates (1972) argues that sub-national governments
have no suitable redistributive instruments. If sub-national governments raise taxes in order to
equalize, such programs are not likely to succeed because the economic units can easily move across
local boundaries, undermining the goals of such programs. Thus, governments can only equalize
living standards across regions at a higher centralized government level. In a similar line of rea-
soning Boadway (2001) discusses the possibility of shifting equity objectives to lower government
levels. He emphasizes that the redistributive power of sub-national governments will lead to polit-
ical programs that do not conform to the national interest. Moreover, sub-national redistributive
power will result in scal competition with a sub-optimal outcome from a national equity point of
view [see also Boadway and Flatters (1982)]. Another argument is related to the budgetary power
of central and local governments. As devolution proceeds, decentralization weakens the power of
the central government to support poorer regions, and disparities manifest or even increase [see
also Oates (1999)]. In a similar manner, Prud'homme (1995) argues that central governments
will attempt to produce a more equal distribution by channeling resources from richer areas to
poorer ones. This view is supported by Persson and Tabellini (1996), who analyze the eects of
intergovernmental transfers on redistribution, nding less equalization in decentralized countries.
However, from a public choice perspective, it is not necessarily the case that centralized systems re-
6distribute to poorer regions. Richer regions are often disproportionately strong negotiators because
the central government cares more about their political support. Those regions therefore have a
larger impact on the regional policies of the central government, possibly leading to a reduction in
inter-governmental transfers to needy regions. A certain degree of centralization is thus necessary
but not sucient for redistribution.
Altogether, our discussion of the theoretical link between scal decentralization and regional dispar-
ities shows no clear-cut picture, making empirical investigation necessary. This is not surprising,
since we cannot refer to a single, well-established theoretical model, but must instead consider
the various aspects of the devolution of powers separately. In light of this, we have to consider
dierent measures for decentralization in our empirical analysis in order to test the miscellaneous
theoretical arguments mentioned above. A focal point of the theoretical discussion is related to
the inter-jurisdictional competition involved in scal decentralization [Qian and Weingast (1997),
Prud'homme (1995)]. Therefore, we use{among others{a class of decentralization measures re
ect-
ing the scal autonomy of sub-national governments. The following section will introduce these
measures in detail as well as other important data issues.
3 The data
3.1 Measures of regional disparity
Measuring regional disparities within countries is dicult, and various measurements are therefore
used in the literature. Three dierent decisions arise when measuring regional inequality: the
choice of an appropriate economic indicator as the basis for the calculation, the territorial level to
be applied, and an applicable concentration measure [see e.g., Spieza (2003) and Lessmann (2006),
pp. 9-12, for details].
Economic indicator: The existing cross-country studies of the impact of scal decentralization on
regional disparities use regional per capita income [Shankar and Shah (2003)], regional GDP per
employee [Gil Canaleta et al. (2004)], or regional GDP per capita [Rodr guez-Pose and Gill (2004),
Ezcurra and Pascual (2008)] as a starting point for calculating disparity measures. Regional income
per capita has the disadvantage that it also includes social security benets. Since we do not focus
on individual redistribution in our paper, the eects of such redistributive instruments should be
factored out as much as possible. GDP per capita (GDPpc) and GDP per employee (GDPpe) are
more appropriate for a cross-country study, but both have some important assets and drawbacks.
A disparity measure based on GDPpe is less sensitive to commuting between jurisdictions, but
dierent unemployment rates between two regions could create a distortionary bias. If we use
7GDPpc, we do not have the latter issue, but commuters are problematic, especially in countries
with large metropolitan areas such as Germany (Hamburg, Bremen, Berlin) or Belgium (Brussels).
Weighing up the pros and cons, we decided to choose GDPpc in the body of our paper since
that data is available for considerably more countries.2 Nevertheless, we consider the GDPpe for
robustness tests.
Territorial level: A further problem arises from the dierent sizes of the regions considered. In
countries with large economic dierences and an unequally distributed population, a disparity mea-
sure might be biased up- or downward. Therefore, it is necessary to use a territorial classication
that creates relatively homogeneous regions. We address this problem in two dierent ways: rst,
we use the Eurostat Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) classication level 2
within Europe and state level data for countries outside Europe, which provides us with widely
homogeneous regions. Second, we calculate a disparity measure that is adjusted for the dierent
sizes of the regions (wcov).
Concentration measures: The last question is which concentration measures are applicable for the
measurement of regional disparities. Dierent measures of inequality do not always provide the
same country disparity ranking. Especially in cross-country analyses, the concentration measure
should be independent of the number of regions considered, should not be sensitive to shifts in
average GDP levels, and should satisfy the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle. This principle says
that an arithmetical transfer from rich to poor regions reduces inequality [see Dalton (1920) and
Pigou (1912)]. The coecient of variation (cov), the adjusted Gini coecient (adgini) and the

































where  y is the country's average GDPpc, yi is the GDPpc of region i, pi is the share of the
country's total population in region i, and n is the number of sub-national units. We calculate
all three disparity measures for 23 OECD countries using data from national statistical oces
and Cambridge Econometrics. Our robustness section also considers the coecient of variation of
GDPpe (covPE). Table 1 shows the results for two dierent 5-year averaged periods.
2Using the GDPpe, we have to exclude Switzerland, Norway, Japan, Canada and the US from our sample of 23
OECD countries.
8Table 1: Regional disparity in OECD countries
Disparity measures
Coecient of Adjusted Gini Weighted coecient Coeecient of
variation coecient of variation of variation (GDPpe)
Countries 1982-1986 1996-2000 1982-1986 1996-2000 1982-1986 1996-2000 1982-1986 1996-2000
Austria 22.5 20.1 14.6 12.6 22.7 21.1 21.2 17.4
Belgium 39.8 37.3 18.8 18.9 40.5 37.3 39.8 37.5
Canada 25.6 22.0 15.6 13.8 14.7 14.0
Czech Rep. 38.2 16.4 37.0 33.7
Denmark 10.9 10.9 8.8 8.5 8.6 9.9 10.0 11.6
Finland 13.5 18.4 7.3 11.1 8.6 16.3 12.6 14.7
France 16.9 18.8 7.6 7.5 22.4 27.1 12.4 13.2
Germany (West) 17.9 19.3 9.5 10.2 16.1 18.3 16.6 17.0
Hungary 28.9 18.3 33.7 23.3
Ireland 11.5 19.3 11.0 19.0 9.3 15.4 10.8 16.1
Italy 24.3 25.1 14.9 15.4 25.4 27.2 19.0 17.2
Japan 19.4 9.1 27.3
Mexico 45.5 26.1 60.1
Netherlands
a 25.4 16.5 13.6 10.0 19.4 13.6 26.9 15.5
Norway 15.4 25.8 10.2 14.4 14.0 28.2
Portugal 26.2 19.6 14.2 12.0 29.1 23.5 25.9 19.2
Poland 18.9 10.5 21.1 20.9
Slovakia 53.2 27.2 37.6 55.7
Spain 21.1 19.9 12.6 12.1 18.9 21.9 19.5 16.7
Sweden 7.5 13.5 4.2 6.5 8.7 16.0 5.4 9.6
Switzerland 10.7 13.9 6.9 7.8 11.0 14.8
UK 25.4 29.0 10.4 12.9 30.8 33.9 23.6 28.3
USA 38.6 32.0 14.7 12.5 18.2 16.0
Average 20.8 21.3 11.5 12.1 18.8 21.1 18.7 18.0
Note: a) The disparity measures for the Netherlands refer to 1986 because of a reorganisation in the NUTS
classication. Source: Own calculations from data of national statistical oces and Cambridge Econometrics.
Calculation of averages refers to those countries where data is available for both periods.
The coecient of variation indicates a disparity far below average for the Scandinavian countries
and Switzerland. In contrast, Slovakia, Mexico, and Belgium have a very high level of regional
inequality. These results also hold for the alternative disparity measures, although Table A.1 in
the appendix shows that the correlation between our disparity measures is in some cases only
around 60 percent. Focusing on development over the two periods, the overall average degree of
regional disparity was quite stable. However, disparities within countries developed dierently{in
some countries, regions converged, while they diverged in others.
3.2 Measures of decentralization
In addition to measures for regional disparity, we also need adequate measures of scal decentral-
ization. In this context, most of the existing literature uses either a dummy variable that captures
whether a country has a federal constitution or not or the degree of expenditure decentralization,
which relates the expenditures of sub-national governments to consolidated general government
expenditures. Recalling our theoretical discussion, it is obvious that these measures are not able to
express all the dierent facets of the devolution of powers to sub-national governments. In partic-
ular, given the degree of inter-jurisdictional competition that scal decentralization involves, these
measures are poor approximations. We overcome this problem by considering several alternative
9decentralization measures that re
ect de jure and de facto decentralization without neglecting the
commonly used ones.
A necessary condition for the devolution of powers to sub-national jurisdictions is the existence of
institutions in those jurisdictions. This property of decentralization can be measured by designing
indicators for the organization of governments with respect to laws and institutions from a political
economy perspective [see e.g., Lijphart (1984) or Treisman (2002)]. The indices of Treisman (2002)
in particular have often been used in the recent literature, and thus we adopt them for our analysis.
Among others, Treisman has created two decentralization measures: a federal dummy (federal)
capturing whether a federal constitution exists (1) or not (0), and a measure of the number of
vertical government tiers (tiers). These de jure indicators are constructed so that they are time
invariant in most countries and are therefore only applicable for cross-section analysis.
The class of de jure decentralization measures does not, however, indicate the degree of authority
and autonomy sub-national governments have. Therefore, most authors revert to measures of de
facto scal decentralization based on nancial accounts. We follow this approach and adopt the
following commonly used measures: degree of expenditure decentralization (expdec) and degree
of revenue decentralization (revdec). These decentralization indices are calculated by relating
the sum of state and local expenditures (revenues) to total government expenditures (revenues)
adjusted for intergovernmental grants. Note that, since we include the redistributive eects of
social security funds as a control variable, we exclude social expenditures and revenues from our
calculations here.
Oates (1972) discusses the limitations of such \classical" decentralization measures. He argues
that these measures do not always represent the actual degree of decentralization because it is
also important to consider the autonomy of sub-national governments in expenditure or revenue
decisions. Otherwise, if sub-national autonomy were not taken into account, these \classical"
decentralization measures would indicate a high level of decentralization even though a wide range
of sub-national expenditure and revenue decisions is determined by the federal government. To get
rid of this bias, the OECD has developed an internationally comparable framework to assess the
degree of control sub-central governments have over their revenues [see OECD (1999)]. Table 2
presents the OECD framework of tax classication.
10Table 2: OECD framework of tax classication
Classication of taxes in decreasing order of control over revenue sources
(a) SCG determines tax rate and tax base.
(b) SCG determines tax rate only
(c) SCG determines tax base only
(d) tax sharing:
(d.1) SCG determines revenue-split
(d.2) revenue-split only changed with consent of SCG
(d.3) revenue-split unilaterally changed by central government (CG)
(d.4) revenue-split unilaterally changed by CG (in annual budgetary process)
(e) CG determines tax rate and tax base
CG: central government; SCG: sub-central government; Source: OECD (1999).
The rst three rows (a, b, and c) in Table 2 can be interpreted as taxes that sub-national gov-
ernments can determine autonomously, and (d.1) and (d.2) represent shared (or composite) taxes
that are in
uenced by both central and sub-central governments. In the cases (d.3), (d.4), and
(e), the taxes are completely controlled by the central government. All kinds of taxes covered
by OECD Government Revenue Statistics are classied in this respect. We follow authors such
as, for example, Rodden (2004) and Stegarescu (2005) and create new decentralization measures
re
ecting the revenue autonomy of sub-national jurisdictions. We calculate the \adjusted revenue
decentralization index" (adrevdec), relating all autonomous revenues of sub-national governments
to total government revenues, as well as the \tax decentralization index" (taxdec), focusing just
on government tax revenues:
adrevdec =




(a) + (b) + (c)
total government tax revenue
. (5)
The taxdec decentralization measure not only re
ects the degree of autonomy sub-national gov-
ernments have over their revenue sources, but it also approximates the scope local governments
have to compete with each other in terms of taxes. Recall that inter-jurisdictional competition
is a key theoretical argument about the nature of the link between scal decentralization and
regional disparities [Prud'homme (1995), Qian and Weingast (1997)]. Table 3 compares our six
measures for de jure and de facto decentralization, where a high value indicates a high degree of
decentralization.3
3Our observation period ends in the year 2000 since there was a change in the classications of the IMF govern-
ment nance statistics (GFS) in 2001. Government nance data based on the new classications are available since
1995. Since we are interested in long time-series data, we revert to data based on the standards for the compilation
of statistics required for scal analysis that were established by the 1986 GFS Manual.
11Table 3: Decentralization in OECD countries
\de jure" \de facto"
Treisman expdec revdec adrevdec taxdec
Countries federal tiers '82-86 '96-00 '82-86 '96-00 '82-86 '96-00 '82-86 '96-00
Austria 1 4 41.0 43.5 42.8 42.9 14.1 14.1 3.5 3.5
Belgium 1 4 18.5 17.3 18.8 17.4 7.7 24.7 6.7 24.2
Canada 1 4 57.7 61.6 62.7 61.5 53.9 56.7 52.0 52.5
Czech Republic 0 3 24.0 23.9
Denmark 0 3 46.8 48.4 47.1 46.1 30.0 32.3 28.5 31.8
Finland 0 3 44.8 41.4 44.4 41.3 31.5 31.3 26.3 25.3
France 0 4 27.7 29.7 26.1 30.1 17.1 23.1 14.2 19.2
Germany (West) 1 4 64.4 63.6 61.3 60.9 22.1 20.9 7.6 7.4
Hungary 0 3 24.9 30.3 24.7 32.4
Ireland 0 3 27.5 27.3 28.8 27.4 9.6 9.5 2.6 2.3
Italy 0 4 27.0 31.4 34.3 30.2 6.2 9.9 0.4 7.5
Japan 0 33.5 36.5
Mexico 1 3 16.8 36.3 23.1 37.7
Netherlands 0 3 35.3 34.3 37.9 36.5 10.3 14.7 4.2 5.1
Norway 0 3 33.0 33.6 29.3 30.1 25.4 24.9 24.1 23.1
Poland 0 3 28.2 36.3 28.8 33.1
Portugal 0 3 13.0 12.9 6.3 0.4 3.1
Slovakia 0 4 11.3 11.0
Spain 1 4 32.5 48.8 32.8 45.7 14.5 20.7 10.6 20.5
Sweden 0 3 40.1 38.6 45.0 38.8 42.6 40.0 41.9 43.5
Switzerland 1 3 70.0 68.3 69.9 69.3 63.6 60.7 57.2 53.9
UK 0 4 28.7 25.4 29.3 28.5 18.4 9.4 13.4 4.8
USA 1 4 50.2 59.2 57.9 59.9 43.2 46.3 36.8 36.4
Average 38.9 41.7 40.7 41.4 25.6 27.4 20.6 22.6
Source: Own calculations from the IMF Government Finance Statistics and the OECD Government Revenue Statistics.
Variables federal and tiers are taken from Treisman (2002).
The bottom line of Table 3 presents the average degree of decentralization and demonstrates that,
indeed, there has been a general trend toward decentralization since the 1980s. Looking more
closely at individual countries, however, we nd movement in both directions: a rapid increase in
decentralization in some countries (e.g., Spain) as well as a shift to centralization in others (e.g., the
UK). Turning to the dierent decentralization measures, we nd noteworthy dierences, especially
between revdec, adrevdec and taxdec. Switzerland, Canada and the US have a competitive scal
federalism. Local governments in these countries have both a high level of authority, as indicated
by the degrees of revenue and expenditure decentralization and a high degree of scal autonomy,
as shown by the high values of adrevdec and taxdec. Germany is an example of a cooperative
federal system since sub-national jurisdictions have a lot of authority but few autonomous nancial
resources. Table A.2 in the appendix shows correlations between our decentralization measures,
indicating that the dierent measures indeed re
ect dierent attributes of decentralization.
3.3 Other determinants of regional disparities
In order to minimize possible omitted variable bias in the coecient of our decentralization mea-
sures, we include in our regressions a number of controls that have been shown in the literature to
impact regional disparity. Following the suggestions of Kuznets (1955), we consider the population
12size (pop), the population distribution within a federation (popgini), and the degree of urbanisation
(urban) as controls for agglomeration. We control for country size eects using total population.
The Gini coecient of the population concentration (popgini) re
ects the extent of agglomeration
within a country. The degree of urbanisation is also a control for agglomeration eects, although
it re
ects a dierent kind of agglomeration compared to the popgini variable. Although the degree
of urbanisation can be high within a country, meaning that the majority of people live in urban
areas, that does not necessarily imply that urbanisation varies across sub-national jurisdictions.
In the latter case, we would not expect a large eect on our disparity measure.
Another control is national wealth as re
ected by GDP per capita (gdppc). A wealthier country
has a larger scope for redistributive politics through transmission channels besides interregional
grants and transfers, for which we control separately. Furthermore, Kuznets (1955) suggests that
farm-based economies have a greater level of inequality and that a greater share of the labor force
employed in manufacturing is negatively associated with inequality. Since the regional concentra-
tion of agriculture and manufacturing can be observed for most countries in our sample, we consider
the share of the working population employed in agriculture in our regressions (emplagri). In West
Germany, for example, the share of manufacturing in regional gross value added (GVA) varies be-
tween NUTS 2 regions from 28.4% in Darmstadt to 50.3% in T ubingen (year 2000).4 Another
control variable we consider is the unemployment ratio (unempl). Let us again show the unequal
distribution of unemployment using our example of West Germany: In 2000 the NUTS 2 region
Oberbayern had unemployment of 3.4%, while Braunschweig had the highest unemployment with
9.1%.
From the perspective of the New Economic Geography, regional disparities are aected by glob-
alization. Fujita et al. (1999) suggest that the opening of an economy to the world market could
change internal comparative advantages and hence location patterns. Gianetti (2002) develops a
theoretical model and tests it empirically to show that intensied economic interaction promotes
growth but exacerbates regional disparities within countries. Therefore, our regressions include the
ratio between total trade (exports + imports) and GDP as a measure for global trade involvement
(global).
We control for the size of the welfare state (social) using government expenditures on public
welfare as a share of GDP. If, for example, regions were heterogeneous with respect to productivity,
unemployment etc., then we would expect that people in richer regions would be net contributors
to social security funds, while people in poorer regions would receive net transfers. Thus, one can
4German city states{Hamburg, Bremen, and Berlin{have even smaller manufacturing shares but are not compa-
rable in this respect.
13expect that countries with big welfare states have strong indirect inter-jurisdictional redistribution
systems.
Another instrument for redistribution between regions is conditional or unconditional grants made
to help the poorer regions catch up with the richer ones. Our empirical model includes the average
grants per capita paid by the central government (grantspc). The expected sign of the coecient is
unclear because, on the one hand, such payments may retard the structural change in poor regions
and hamper the eorts of the transfer recipients, but, on the other hand, such transfers supply
nancial resources stimulating the growth of investments.5 See Table A.3 in the appendix for data
sources and denitions and Table A.4 for summary statistics of the relevant variables.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Cross-section results
A major challenge for our analysis is the availability of regional data, which is necessary for the
computation of disparity measures. We need information for a long time period because we are
interested in the dynamics of convergence or divergence within federations, not just disparity
levels. This restricts our cross-section analysis to a sample of 23 OECD countries. Figure 1 shows
a scatter plot that illustrates the close relationship between scal decentralization (expdec) and
regional disparity (cov) based on our cross-country data set. Recall that the negative relationship
observed in the gure implies that a higher degree of decentralization is associated with smaller
regional disparities. Inspection of the raw data suggests that there are no important outliers.
In order to conrm the result of the graphical analysis, and following the approaches of Shankar
and Shah (2003) and Gil Canaleta et al. (2004), we compute the correlation coecient between
regional disparity (cov) and scal decentralization (expdec) to be -0.516, which is statistically
signicant. However, this result might be biased by omitted variables since we do not control for
other determinants of regional inequality. Therefore, we specify the following multiple regression
model:
RDi =  + C i + 
DECi + i; (6)
where RDi denotes the regional disparity in country i, C captures our control variables, DEC
represents the degree of scal decentralization, and  is the error term. Since our sample size of 23
observations does not allow us to consider our entire set of control variables, we choose those with


































Figure 1: Decentralization and regional disparity (period averages)
the highest correlation with our disparity measure (social, urban, gdppc). To reduce potential
problems caused by reverse causality [Wooldridge (2002)], the timing of independent variables is
chosen so that they are long averages for a period (1982-1995) prior to the period of the disparity
measures (1996-2000), giving us a lag structure.
Table 4 presents the cross-section results for dierent specications of equation 6. Due to space
limitations, we present estimation results just for the coecient of variation (cov) as the depen-
dent variable; the other abovementioned disparity measures are used for robustness checks [see
section 5]. White's test for heteroskedasticity in the residuals rejects the null hypothesis of no
heteroskedasticity, so all the standard errors of the coecients are calculated using White (1980)
correction. Columns (1) and (2) show the results for the de jure decentralization measures, and
columns (3) through (6) contain the results for the de facto decentralization measures.
15Table 4: Results: Cross-section estimations with OLS
Dependent variable: Coecient of variation
1 2 3 4 5 6
social -0.885 ** -1.065 *** -1.227 *** -1.283 *** -1.412 *** -1.053 **
-2.18 -2.90 -4.36 -4.34 -3.28 -2.48
urban 0.239 0.204 0.258 0.250 0.302 ** 0.281 *
1.46 1.18 1.62 1.59 2.63 2.12
gdppc -1.044 * -1.050 ** -0.112 -0.090 1.041 ** 0.893 *













constant 36.237 ** 20.144 * 38.366 ** 39.227 ** 11.129 6.534
2.47 1.84 2.58 2.59 1.14 0.73
Obs. 23 22 22 22 17 19
Adj.-R2 0.2334 0.3690 0.4451 0.4264 0.4359 0.3402
F-test p-val. 0.065 0.017 0.006 0.008 0.026 0.041
Note: t-values are reported below the coecients; ***, **, and * indicate
signicance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
The coecients of the de jure decentralization measures are not signicant, implying that political
decentralization has no impact on regional inequality. However, the coecients of the de facto
decentralization measures are all negative and are signicant at conventional condence levels,
supporting our conclusion from Figure 1. The coecients of our control variables indicate that
regional disparities are smaller in countries with large social security systems, smaller in rich
countries, and higher in countries with a high degree of agglomeration. The specications with the
de facto decentralization measures explain about 40 percent of the variation in regional disparities
between countries.6
All in all, our cross-section results indicate a negative impact of scal decentralization on regional
disparities, but we are aware of the problems coming from the small sample size and the potential
endogeneity bias. Therefore, we repeat our estimations with a larger panel data set.
4.2 Panel data evidence
A major advantage of panel data is that it can capture all unobserved time-invariant country-
specic factors, such as geographic area or traditions, by including country xed eects [Baltagi
6We have tried to instrument the decentralization measures with country size in square kilometers, population
density, fragmentation, and average size of sub-national jurisdictions, but we only obtain signicant results (at the
10 percent level) in the last specication (taxdec). Consequently, we can tackle the endogeneity problem in our
cross-section estimation only by lagging the independent variables.
16(1995), Wooldridge (2002)]. In addition, considering country dummies allows us to focus on within-
country variations as opposed to between-country dierences in the cross-section analysis. Another
benet from panel data is the larger number of observations that allows us to consider all of the
important control variables. With panel data, we are able to apply more sophisticated estimation
procedures to determine the direction of causality between the dependent and independent vari-
ables, and thus we eliminate a possible endogeneity bias, which is a major drawback of the existing
empirical literature. However, panel data makes high demands on data preparation and estimation
procedures to avoid misspecication errors such as spurious regression, serial correlation, etc.
In this section, we estimate several panel data models for 17 OECD countries from 1982 to 2000.
Due to the unavailability of scal and especially regional data for certain periods and countries, the
panel dataset is unbalanced. Moreover, we must drop the Eastern European countries, Japan, and
Mexico from the data set due to missing long time series data. Our baseline estimation equation
looks similar to those of the cross-country analysis and has the following form:
RDi;t = i + C i;t + 
DECi;t + t + i;t; (7)
where i captures country-specic xed eects and t represents period xed eects. To avoid
spurious regressions, we need stationary time series in our panel data set. Several unit root tests
such as the Levin, Lin and Chu test, the Im, Pesaran and Shin W-statistics, the augmented
Dickey-Fuller test statistic, and the Phillips-Perron Fisher unit root test rule out the existence of
non-stationary time-series, individual or common unit roots. Furthermore, the Hausman (1978)
specication test rejects models using random eects. We therefore chose the correct econometric
specication for our country xed eects model. Since the Durbin-Watson test statistic indicates
some serial correlation, we use an estimation procedure that considers the AR(1) process of the
error term.7
We address the issue of a potential endogeneity bias in two ways: rst, we apply the two-stage-least-
squares (TSLS) estimation procedure using one period lagged decentralization as an instrument,
and second, we estimate a dynamic panel data model. A dynamic panel data model includes a
lagged dependent variable on the right side of equation (7). In this case, the usual approach of
estimating the xed-eects model with OLS generates a biased estimate of the coecients, since
the country xed eect i is positively correlated with the lagged dependent variable on the right
side of the equation. The problem can be solved by computing the rst dierence of equation (7)
to eliminate the xed eects:
7This procedure assumes that the error term can be serially correlated of rst order "i;t = "i;t 1+ui;t with ui;t
as an independently identically distributed (iid) white noise error term and  as the serial correlation coecient.
17(RDi;t RDi;t 1) = (RDi;t 1 RDi;t 2)+(C i;t C i;t 1)+
(DECit DECi;t 1)+(i;t i;t 1):
(8)
In the dierenced equation, however, the dependence of (i;t   i;t 1) on i;t 1 implies that OLS
estimates of  are inconsistent. Instrumenting is therefore necessary [Bond (2002)]. We use the
Arellano and Bond (1991)-estimator, which considers lagged levels of RDi;t 1  RDi;t 2 as an in-
strument and applies a Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) procedure. The GMM procedure
requires no second-order serial correlation in the disturbances of the rst-dierenced equation, and
thus we provide a test for second order serial correlation (AR2-test).
Table 5 reports the results obtained when we estimate our annual panel using ordinary least squares
(OLS), two-stage-least-squares (TSLS), and the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estima-
tion techniques. Since our de jure decentralization measures are time invariant, their eects are
included in the country xed eects, and we are only able to consider the de facto decentralization
measures. The most important result is that both our static and our dynamic panel regressions
support our cross-section results. The coecients of the dierent decentralization measures are all
negative and are signicant at conventional condence levels. We obtain this result for the OLS re-
gressions as well as for the TSLS and GMM estimations, which control for a potential endogeneity
bias.
We now turn to the interpretation of our control variables, providing deeper insights about the
determinants of regional inequality. As expected, popgini, the measure for the population distri-
bution within a country, has a positive impact on regional disparity{the higher the population
concentration, the larger the regional inequalities. Our other measure for agglomeration, urban,
has no signicant impact on regional disparities in our panel. Moreover, big countries, as re
ected
by the population variable (pop), show lower disparities. In contrast to the above expectations,
the development stage of a country, as re
ected by gdppc, has a positive and signicant eect on
disparities. A possible explanation could be that in the later stages of the development process, the
disparities of a country are manifested, as is postulated by the New Economic Geography [Krugman
(1991)]. Another result of the regressions is that a high unemployment ratio (unempl) seems to
be associated with higher regional inequality. Furthermore, open economies (global) have smaller
disparities than closed ones, supporting the ndings of Gianetti (2002). As expected, the negative
sign on social suggests that social security systems redistribute not only between individuals but
also between regions. Employment in agriculture (emplagri) is signicantly positive in some of
the specications, supporting Kuznets (1955), whereas central government grants (grantspc) do
18not seem to interact with regional inequality.
We have also investigated the possibility of a non-linear relationship between decentralization and
regional disparity. For this purpose, we added the square of our decentralization measures to the
empirical model. In almost all specications, the coecients of our decentralization measures as
well as the coecients of their squares were insignicant. Moreover, the signs of the coecients
were very sensitive to which measure of regional disparity was used. Therefore, we concluded that
there is no clear non-linear relationship.
All in all, our results suggest that scal decentralization does not contribute to an increase in
regional disparities within our sample of OECD countries. On the contrary, our estimates support
the hypothesis that scal decentralization promotes a more balanced distribution of resources
across regions. Using the coecient of variation (cov) as dependent variable this applies to our
decentralization measures re
ecting sub-national government authority (expdec and revdec) as well
as to those measures re
ecting sub-national government autonomy (adrevdec and taxdec). The












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































205 Sensitivity analysis and robustness checks
To check the robustness of our results, we carried out several sensitivity analyses. Although the
estimations above used various measures of scal decentralization, it is necessary to repeat this
procedure with alternative measures of regional disparity to ensure that our results are not sensitive
to the underlying measurement concepts. As discussed in section 3, GDP per capita may be a
biased indicator of regional inequality due to commuters. Therefore, we calculate the coecient
of variation based on GDP per employee (covPE) and consider it in our robustness analysis.
Unfortunately, we have local employment data for a considerably smaller number of countries.
Hence, Norway, Switzerland, the US, and Canada are missing from our panel data set, and Mexico
and Japan are also missing from the cross-section analysis.
Table A.5 in the appendix presents the results we obtain if we estimate our empirical model
with the same econometric methodology as in section 4 but use the adjusted Gini coecient
(adgini), the weighted coecient of variation (wcov), and the coecient of variation based on
the GDPpe (covPE) as the dependent variable (columns 1-12). Due to space limitations, we
are not able to present the entire estimation output, so we focus exclusively on the dierent
decentralization measures and regression diagnostics. Turning our attention to the cross-country
data set (columns 1-3), we nd that all of the decentralization measures are signicantly negative
when adgini and wcov are the dependent variable and are negative but not always signicant for
covPE. Recall that the number of observations is much smaller for covPE, and thus we have
considerably fewer degrees of freedom. In columns 4 to 12, we present the results of our panel
data regressions. On the whole, our nding that scal decentralization negatively impacts regional
disparities holds using the alternative dependent variables. However, it is noteworthy that the
decentralization measures re
ecting sub-national government authorities (expdec and revdec) do
not have signicant eects if we use wcov and covPE as disparity measures and simultaneously
control for a possible endogenity bias (TSLS and GMM). In contrast, the decentralization measures
re
ecting sub-national government autonomy over revenue sources (adrevdec and taxdec) remain
signicant in all specications. This result implies that the impact of scal decentralization on
regional inequality crucially depends on sub-national government autonomy.
Our next robustness check is to build 3-year period-averages of all variables and repeat the panel
estimations with the new data set in order to get rid of business cycle eects. Since we lose several
degrees of freedom due to averaging, we drop the control variables that had no signicant impact
on regional disparities in the annual panel. Columns 13-16 in Table A.5 show the results, which
21support our earlier ndings.8 Again, decentralization measures re
ecting sub-national government
authorities (expdec and revdec) have negative but insignicant or just weakly signicant eects in
several specications.
As the 17 (resp. 23) countries provide only a limited number of cross-sections, the empirical
ndings might vary for dierent samples due to outliers. A further sensitivity analysis, therefore,
consists of systematically dropping countries from the regressions and checking for the robustness
of the results. Except for revdec, which is insignicant in three single cases, we obtain results
similar to the estimations with the full sample. We also modied the sample by dropping the USA
and Canada, because in these cases the state level is used instead of the NUTS 2 classication.
Moreover, we estimated the sample without the three poorest countries, without the three richest
countries, and without both sets of countries. In another sample adjustment, we exclude the
two countries with the highest degree of decentralization and the lowest degree of decentralization,
respectively. All of our results are insensitive to these adjustments, indicating sample independence.
To sum up, the quantitative analysis provides strong evidence for a negative impact of scal
decentralization on regional disparities.
6 Summary and conclusions
In recent public reforms, the negative redistributive eects of scal decentralization were a major
argument against scal decentralization in both scientic and public discussions. However, the
theoretical and empirical ndings on this question are ambiguous. The aim of our paper was to
analyze the impact of dierent kinds of decentralization on regional disparity. Since measuring scal
decentralization and regional inequality is challenging, we have discussed and calculated several
alternative measures. Cross-section regressions have shown that countries with a high degree of
scal decentralization exhibit small regional disparities, and panel regressions have indicated that
increasing decentralization leads to decreasing disparity within countries. Our sample consists
of 17 (resp. 23) highly developed OECD countries in the period from 1982 to 2000. Our main
result holds for dierent disparity measures as well as for dierent decentralization measures.
Instrumental variable as well as dynamic panel regressions suggest that causation runs from more
decentralization to less regional disparities. In general, the results indicate that decentralization is
not harmful to the equity of regions, and instead the converse may be true.
Nevertheless, there are considerable dierences between alternative decentralization concepts. First,
8We also ran instrumental variable regressions and regressions with lagged decentralization measures and obtained
similar results. All results discussed in this section which are not presented in Table A.5 are available from the
author on request.
22our cross-section analysis shows that de jure decentralization measures{re
ecting political decentra-
lization{have no signicant impact on regional inequality, while the eect of de facto decentraliza-
tion measures{re
ecting scal decentralization{is signicant negative. Therefore, we can conclude
that it is not political decentralization but scal decentralization, which determines regional in-
equality. Second, concerning the de facto decentralization measures, we nd the coecients of
the \classical"degree of revenue decentralization (revdec) as well as the \classical"degree of ex-
penditure decentralization (expdec) become insignicant in some of the robustness tests where
we control for alternative measurement concepts of regional disparity simultaneously with a po-
tential endogeneity bias. This shows us that sub-national government \authorities", as re
ected
by expdec and revdec, are not necessarily the driving force in regional inequalities. We obtain
the more robust results considering the \autonomy"of jurisdictions as re
ected by decentralization
measures focusing on autonomous revenues of sub-national governments (adrevdec and taxdec).
In conclusion, our results support the theoretical argument that decentralization improves public
sector eciency at the local level [see e.g., Oates (1993)] and that the devolution of power gives
poorer regions the scope they need to compete with richer ones [see e.g., McKinnon (1997) and
Qian and Weingast (1997)].
Some additional remarks are necessary. The results presented here can only be generalized for
highly developed countries like those considered in the analysis. It is possible that, in poor coun-
tries, decentralization has a negative impact on redistribution between regions. In a less developed
country with weak institutions and extensive corruption, decentralization could give the local au-
thority the chance to exploit the citizens and local companies. Therefore, decentralization might be
harmful in poor countries for allocative as well as redistributive reasons. In transition economies,
as in some Eastern European countries, decentralization could also increase inequality between
regions. Unlike the countries in our study, these countries historically had centralized, communist
scal constitutions and face now very fast growing agglomeration centers. This dierence could not
be addressed in this paper because the available time series are too short for a study of transition
economies. Such an analysis is a question for further research.
Our policy implication is that increasing scal decentralization, even in terms of inter-jurisdictional
competition, would not be harmful for the distribution between regions. This holds for the decen-
tralization of sub-national government authority as well as for that of autonomy. Our results might
also have some implications for European Union regional policy. As the EU tends to harmonize and
centralize more and more decision-making processes in supra-national institutions, our message is
that competition between regions is not harmful for convergence.
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Table A.1: Correlation of disparity measures
cov adgini wcov covPE
cov 1.000
adgini 0.788 *** 1.000
wcov 0.931 *** 0.625 *** 1.000
covPE 0.964 *** 0.767 *** 0.869 *** 1.000
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table A.2: Correlation of decentralization measures
\de jure" \de facto"
federal tiers expdec revdec adrevdec taxdec
federal 1.000
tiers 0.449 ** 1.000
expdec 0.505 ** 0.097 1.000
revdec 0.510 ** 0.111 0.989 *** 1.000
adrevdec 0.366 -0.144 0.780 *** 0.809 *** 1.000
taxdec 0.222 -0.198 0.658 *** 0.690 *** 0.978 *** 1.000
Note: ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
Table A.3: Data sources and denitions
Variable Denition Source
cov Coecient of variation of regional GDP per capita. National statistics, Cambridge Econometrics
wcov Weighted coecient of variation of regional GDP per
capita.
National statistics, Cambridge Econometrics
adgini Adjusted Gini coecient of regional GDP per capita. National statistics, Cambridge Econometrics
covPE Coecient of variation of regional GDP per employee. National statistics, Cambridge Econometrics
popgini Gini coecient of the population concentration among
national regions.
National statistics, Cambridge Econometrics
urban Share of urban living population. World Bank (WDI)
pop Total Population. World Bank (WDI)
gdppc GDP per capita. National statistics
emplagri Share of employees working in agriculture World Bank (WDI)
unempl National unemployment rate World Bank (WDI)
global Sum of the relation between imports and GDP and the
relation of exports and GDP
World Bank (WDI)
social Share of total national social expenditures in relation to
GDP.
World Bank (WDI)
grantspc Central government grants per capita IMF (Government Finance Statistics)
federal Dummy for countries with a federal constitution Treisman (2002)
tiers Index for the number of vertical government tiers Treisman (2002)
expdec Share of sub-national expenditures in relation to total
government expenditures without social funds.
IMF (Government Finance Statistics)
revdec Share of sub-national revenue in relation to total govern-
ment revenue without social funds.
IMF (Government Finance Statistics)
adrevdec Autonomous revenue decentralization. OECD Revenue Statistics
taxdec Decentralization of tax revenue. OECD Revenue Statistics
27Table A.4: Summary statistics, panel data
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
cov 319 20.695 7.819 6.620 SE 48.177 US
wcov 319 19.604 8.230 6.984 DK 42.289 BE
adgini 319 11.665 3.626 3.943 SE 20.939 NL
covPE 243 17.984 8.003 4.971 SE 41.924 BE
expdec 276 0.403 0.152 0.091 PT 0.703 CH
revdec 276 0.411 0.154 0.108 PT 0.724 CH
adrevdec 276 0.262 0.163 0.041 PT 0.644 CH
taxdec 321 0.206 0.177 0.002 IT 0.587 CH
popgini 323 0.371 0.123 0.173 NO 0.638 CA
urban 323 74.471 12.765 32.317 PT 97.335 BE
pop 323 38.168 59.146 3.480 IE 282.224 US
gdppc 323 17.874 5.452 6.500 IE 33.960 US
emplagri 323 6.742 4.565 1.500 UK 25.200 PT
unempl 312 8.399 4.481 0.400 CH 23.900 NE
global 323 69.445 30.573 17.253 US 175.557 IE
social 317 15.867 3.737 8.200 IE 28.900 NL
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